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Abstract 
This paper addresses the concept of semiotic scaffolding by considering it in light 
of questions arising from the contemporary challenge to the humanities. This 
challenge comes from a mixture of scientistic demands, opportunism on the part of 
Western governments in thrall to neo-liberalism, along with crass economic 
utilitarianism. In this paper we attempt to outline what a theory of semiotic 
scaffolding may offer to an understanding of the humanities’ contemporary role, as 
well as what the humanities might offer to the elucidation of semiotic scaffolding. 
We argue that traditional humanist positions adopted in defence of the humanities 
fail to articulate the enhancement of humanity that semiotic scaffolding represents. 
At the same time, we note that the concept of scaffolding is sometimes in danger of 
taking on a functionalist perspective which understanding the humanities modus 
operandi is likely to dispel. Putting forward these arguments, we draw on the work 
of Peirce, Cassirer and Sebeok in elucidating the structural and ‘future-orientated’ 
benefits of the scaffolding process as it suffuses the humanities.  
Keywords: semiotic scaffolding, humanities, science, Andy Clark, Cassirer, Peirce, 
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The challenge to the humanities in the contemporary conjuncture is two-fold. On 
one side, the humanities are charged with the task of achieving – and proving that 
they have achieved – immediate economic use-value. On the other side, the three 
hundred year-long rise of the natural sciences, and particularly their relation to 
technological development, have effectively thrown down the gauntlet to the 
humanities and challenged them to prove their worth. In what follows, we will 
argue that some of the responses to these challenges to the humanities uncritically 
fall back on traditional humanist positions derived from the very traditions of 
thought that are ultimately challenging the legitimacy of the humanities in the 
present. We suggest that an alternative perspective on the humanities – one that is 
critical of crass utilitarianism but is nonetheless unwilling to dismiss use-value – is 
offered by cognitive semiotics. Focusing on the process of ‘scaffolding’ posited by 
Clark and extended by Hoffmeyer, but anticipated by Peirce and Cassirer, we 
argue that the idea of ‘scaffolding’ currently provides the best approach to the 
structural and ‘future-orientated’ benefits of the humanities. At the same time, with 
reference to Sebeok, we consider how descriptions of ‘scaffolding’ might be 
revised as a result of thinking through the concept in relation to the humanities.  
The construction work term ‘scaffolding’ was adopted and developed in the work 
of the psychologist Jerome Bruner (1957, 1960, 1966) and interpreters of Lev 
Vygotsky such as David Wood (Wood, Bruner and Ross 1976). in relation to 
young children’s building on already mastered skills in the process of learning. In 
biosemiotics, Jesper Hoffmeyer further developed the concept, generalizing it to 
cover the network of semiotic interactions connecting an organism with its 
Umwelt, facilitating its processes of perception and action: “The network of 
semiotic interactions by which individual cells, organisms, populations, or 
ecological units are controlling their activities can thus be seen as scaffolding 
devices assuring that an organism’s activities become tuned to that organism’s 
needs” (Hoffmeyer 2007: 154). This biosemiotic use of ‘scaffolding’ has several 
aspects. One is genetic assimilation - the idea that structures appearing in the 
lifetime of organisms may, over generations, become genetically coded, provided 
those structures give the organisms selective advantage. Here, the scaffold 
metaphor is stretched a bit - or used creatively, as it were: the scaffold is not taken 
down when the building behind it is finished, rather, the scaffold becomes, over 
time, part of the building itself. Another aspect of ‘scaffolding’ has to do with the 
articulation, subdivision, detailing of a process so that those process parts or 
aspects may receive a higher degree of detail control; the more sub-processes are 
rendered partially autonomous and hence controllable, the more probable is the 
safe and successful completion of the overall sum process. Simultaneously, the 
autonomy of parts may facilitate a higher degree of flexibility by means of making 
different combinations of parts possible. Still another aspect of much, if not all, 
‘scaffolding’, highlighted by the metaphor, is its external, material aspect in 
relation to the single organism: many organisms do not simply exist in an 
otherwise unchanging, neutral environment; rather, their activity to some degree 
shapes and changes their Umwelt so that its affordances more easily allow for the 
organism to enact its activities. Finally, according to Hoffmeyer’s argument, such 
scaffolding invariably has semiotic aspects: the piecing together of the semi-
autonomous parts of a scaffolding has the character of meaning-bearing couplings 
as they support still more complicated versions of the basically significant 
perception-action cycle.  
The scaffolding concept thus plays a major role in a biosemiotic worldview. Yet, 
will it also throw light upon the behaviour and Umwelt of that atypical animal, the 
human being? In what follows, we consider this question with specific reference to 
the humanities, currently at a fateful moment in their development, as well as the 
creative and linguistic constituents that underpin the humanities. Before 
proceeding, then, we should summarize why the humanities cannot simply stand 
alone at the present conjuncture and suggest why their implication with scaffolding 
needs to be iterated. 
The ‘rise’ of the humanities can be traced back to Cicero’s concept of humanitas – 
being good – and its development in Western education, particularly the trivium 
and quadrivium of medieval philosophy faculties, embracing humanities and 
natural sciences alike, as against the professions (medicine, law, theology). Closer 
to our time, though, the humanities in their most familiar form are a product of 
nineteenth-century
 
Western education: they developed in tandem with the forging 
of a liberal hegemony in industrial society of that period and contributed to the 
reproduction, through instruction - in what is civilized and ‘good’ - of the 
bourgeois class in their mercantile and civic incarnations. Again, the philosophical 
faculty contained humanities as well as sciences (as is still the case in the Liberal 
Arts programmes in the US), while the natural sciences only became autonomous 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The decline of the humanities has 
arguably occurred steadily through the same period in the face of the rise of the 
natural sciences (Kagan 2009), but most rapidly with Western governments’ 
promotion of STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) in the 
academy during recent decades, managed through a crisis of funding. 
In response to these latter attacks, the defence of the humanities has been 
undertaken by numerous of its representatives in the last few years, often re-
hashing jaded ideas from the very liberal hegemony which has lately sought to 
condemn the humanities to, at best, marginal status in society and, at worst, 
oblivion. Thus, the humanities have been cast by their defenders as the repository 
of ‘values’ (McDonald 2011) or, even more pointedly, ‘good’ values as opposed to 
“our current values and their devastating consequences on a precarious world” 
(O’Gorman 2011: 281). The humanities, it has been claimed, teach people how to 
live their lives (Andrews 1994: 163), they condense collective experience (Bate 
2011: 66) and they preserve both democracy (Nussbaum 2010) and civilization 
(Watt 2011: 205). A further confection on liberal protestations in favour of saving 
the humanities is located at the intersection of national languages, ethics and 
multiculturalism. Other languages, the argument goes, enrich our culture (Kelly 
2011; Freeman 1994) and allow knowledge of ‘the other’ in a fashion that, at the 
very least, provides the platform for an ethical standpoint. The humanities are seen 
as crucial to promoting diversity – teaching students to work with others who are 
not like them (Tuchman 2009: 208) – because, unlike approaches in some business 
schools, for example, the humanities are putatively opposed, in their very 
existence, to de-humanization. Echoing psychologists such as Zimbardo and 
Milgram, as well as prominent critics of business education from within business 
schools, such as Ghoshal (2005) and De George (1994), Nussbaum (2010: 23) 
insists that “It is easier to treat people as objects to be manipulated if you have 
never learned any other way to see them”. 
Growing out of the definition of the humanities as fostering harmony or standing 
against de-humanization, is a slightly more entrenched position. Here, the 
discussion of the immediate use-value of the humanities is repudiated in favour of 
a subtle formulation of inherent worth. Bate shows that the ‘value’ of the 
humanities cannot be calculated in the immediate way that many translations of 
scientific developments into technological advance can. In the wake of 9/11 and 
resurgent Islamic fundamentalism, he writes (2011: 2), “it was perhaps unfortunate 
that the swingeing funding cuts to higher education in the early 1980s fell with 
particular severity on supposedly marginal areas of the humanities such as Islamic 
Studies”. More emphatic, still, is Fish’s refusal to rise to the challenge: 
To the question ‘of what use are the humanities?’, the only honest answer is 
none whatsoever. And it is an answer that brings honor to its subject. 
Justification, after all, confers value on an activity from a perspective outside 
its performance. An activity that cannot be justified is an activity that refuses 
to regard itself as instrumental to some larger good. The humanities are their 
own good. There is nothing more to say, and anything that is said . . . 
diminishes the object of its supposed praise (Fish 2008). 
Fish, here, is responding in particular to those who would attempt to furnish the 
humanities with ‘effects’ or ‘results’ in the manner of some areas of the sciences 
and business. Nevertheless, it is a view broadly shared with some other 
contemporary commentators on the threatened demolition of universities. For 
example, Collini’s eloquent ripostes to the asinine forces of instrumentalism are 
predicated on certain areas of inquiry being justified by the fact that they are 
“inherently” good or interesting (Collini 2012). 
What is clear is that arguments about the role of the humanities in social life are at 
somewhat of an impasse. The debate needs to be shifted to a new terrain where 
questions of how best to re-state the benefits of humanities in terms of the sciences 
and business or statements about the intrinsic ‘goodness’ of the humanities are 
rendered redundant. Hoffmeyer’s semiotic inflection of scaffolding, we would 
argue, offers a possibility of such a shift – although it is a one which currently has 
limitations and demands development. 
In brief, the concept of semiotic scaffolding, when employed to interrogate the 
contribution of the humanities to humans, shifts the debate away from the current 
impasse to a cognitive and semiotic domain. Employment of the concept evinces a 
concern not so much with the ‘content’ of the humanities as somehow enriching 
people through its promotion of a supposedly ethical perspective or with the 
humanities as a store of data, historical and contemporary, which can be sampled 
over time. Nor is a cognitive and semiotic approach preoccupied with abstract 
notions of the ‘good’. Instead, it focuses on the manner in which semiosis within 
an Umwelt allows or prevents an organism from functioning in an apposite manner 
in respect of environmental constraints and neighbouring Umwelten. As a rule, the 
human Umwelt has characteristics that are of special note. 
Much research into cognition (for example, Donald 1991, Tomasello et al 2005, 
Greenspan and Shanker 2004, and many others) has pointed to the fact that the 
strange and growing abilities of humans have emerged through intersubjectivity 
and the co-evolution of culture, language, and brain in relatively recent humanoid 
history. The brain is not to be conceived as a computing mechanism dictating 
motor actions and cultural interactions. Nor are culture and civilization any longer 
to be taken as mere icing on a biological cake already baked. Rather, culture and 
civilization have, at least since early development of language in hominids, if not 
earlier, fed back onto evolution. Thus, those humans who have been more able to 
learn, teach, and develop further language and culture have been favoured in the 
process of survival. This is also the view of the ‘Baldwinian evolution’ that 
biosemiotics has been instrumental in revivifying (Weber and Depew 2003). In this 
scenario, features such as the large human neocortex, the brain’s linguistic circuits, 
hands able to grasp objects, and so forth, seem very likely to have co-evolved with 
human culture, communication and tool use. The interaction of these sets 
exemplifies, as it were, scaffoldings which have, over the course of generations, 
become part of the construction itself.  
Important and often unrecognized forerunners of such a view include some classics 
of semiotics. Charles Peirce was not only the father of pragmatism, but also of 
semiotics. This double paternity made him emphasize the externalization of signs, 
closely related to possible pragmatic action. Hence, for Peirce, externalized signs 
are not mere supportive devices; instead, they undertake tasks which simply could 
not be performed by the brain alone:  
Again, the psychologists undertake to locate various mental powers in the 
brain; and above all consider it as quite certain that the faculty of language 
resides in a certain lobe; but I believe it comes decidedly nearer the truth 
(though not really true) that language resides in the tongue. In my opinion it is 
much more true that the thoughts of a living writer are in any printed copy of 
his book than that they are in his brain (‘Minute Logic’, 1902, CP 7.364). 
To put the matter another way, the author’s brain is indispensable for writing the 
book - but the contents of the book as a whole was never once present in the 
author’s mind; rather, the long and cumbersome process of writing constructs an 
artifice which contains thoughts and reasonings whose sum transgresses, by far, the 
online capacities of the author’s here-and-now consciousness. This immediately is 
an offload function: the book remembers far more, and far more accurately, than 
the brain involved in its construction. But that is not all: having externalized an 
argument structure in a book chapter, the writer is free to take the results as new 
starting points, as scaffolds, for the next chapter - effectively constructing the book 
as a long, coherent argumentative arc which was never present to the author's mind 
in its entirety. Signs, in this way, are indispensable scaffoldings for humans in 
thought and action. This comes to the fore in Peirce's doctrine of diagrammatical 
reasoning - the manipulation and experiment with diagrams, externalized, in the 
imagination, or the two in combination - is taken to be central to thought and 
cognition (cf. Stjernfelt 2007).
 
 
This, of course, is not limited to books (even if the technology of writing seems 
particularly important for the inheritance and accumulation of culture over 
generations). Indeed, the Toronto School after Innis and McLuhan has been 
dedicated to pursuing the scaffolding processes or extensions of humans in their 
mental and physical habitation of technology. Institutions, arts, crafts, infrastructure 
and technology form externalized scaffolds, moulding human behaviour in certain 
directions, affecting the bequests and reinterpretation of these scaffolds as well as 
the ongoing cultural selection between them, making possible their further 
development over generations.  
This last is the central tenet of Ernst Cassirer’s contribution to semiotics, his 
doctrine of ‘Symbolic Forms’ (1955), which has significant consequences for the 
remit of the humanities. The Symbolic Forms idea addresses the large, interlinked 
domains of human activity insofar as such forms are externalized in institutions, 
signs and practices. Cassirer never made a final list of Symbolic Forms, but art, 
myth, religion, language, science, politics, technology are sure to count among 
them. As an Enlightenment neo-Kantian from the Marburg school, his aim was to 
generalize Kantian epistemology: humans not only construct knowledge of the 
world through the growing, self-correcting corpus of sciences from physics to art 
history; humans also construct their world through other large, specific structures of 
Symbolic Forms. Importantly, for Cassirer, this process is not the result of the 
existence of a fixed human subject undertaking a growing number of diversified 
tasks; rather, the human subject itself forms the mirror part of the process, each new 
development of a symbolic form simultaneously giving rise to new forms of related 
subjectivity, new types of perception and action - crystallizing, as it were, the 
subjective aspect of this ongoing scaffolding process. Historically, Cassirer 
conceived of this process by way of a sort of secularized Hegelianism. He did not 
inherit Hegel’s historicism (and its potential for relativism); remaining in this 
respect a Kantian, he interpreted Hegel’s doctrine of the evolution of the world 
spirit in a cool, demystified manner: the human’s access to the achievement of 
culture invariably traverses externalized Symbolic Forms - scaffoldings.  
Each generation must confront itself with the vast mass of externalized forms - it is 
only through the ongoing reinterpretation, selection, and interaction with 
established Symbolic Forms that humans are able to become encultured and bring 
forth further civilization. This also entails the important point that humans, 
including when they operate in the sciences, have no direct access to the ‘deep 
essence’ of themselves. In this sense, humans are decisively alienated from 
themselves - but in a non-tragic way, as the growing mass of Symbolic Forms 
simultaneously offers humans vast possibilities of experience, action, and liberty to 
which they would have no access if humans were essential in being and 
‘unscaffolded’. The understanding of the being and capabilities of the human 
species therefore allows no direct shortcut to an easily grasped essence (as vitalists, 
existentialists, neuroscientists and others have sometimes, in different ways, 
imagined and hoped). The abilities and limits of humans can be studied only by 
investigating in detail their large array of semiotic scaffoldings. The essence of 
being human is not given once and for all but finds expression in the ever evolving 
externalizations of symbolic forms. It is not only in them that what is great and 
what is disastrous in the history of humankind is to be measured, but it is in these 
achievements that it is possible to gain a grasp of what it means to be human and to 
be aware of their possible development further in the future.  
The humanities does involve such pursuits as: asking what constitutes ‘good’ 
writing, painting, sculpture, dance, performance, design, architecture, etc. as well as 
what creative processes led to ‘movements’ in historical periods regardless of 
whether they are construed by some as for ‘better’ or ‘worse’; establishing the 
intriguing detail of the formation of states and empires and social and cultural 
developments across the globe; inquiring why certain rituals have developed in 
human history and what constitutes a ‘ritual’; investigating belief systems, 
ideologies and all cultural practices from body augmentation to table manners; 
interrogating the nuances and systematic manifestations of verbal language and 
non-verbal communication across the globe; investigating the growth of human 
cognitive possibilities in their interplay with technological enhancements from 
abacuses to computers; conceptualizing the varied media that have been used by 
humans and the content that has been conveyed by them; questioning the way that 
humans have produced and continue to produce ever more elaborate and simplified 
ways of making music; charting the history of the sciences in different cultures and 
how they interact with society; mapping the large issue of human historical 
evolution, interpreting archaeological vestiges, early language and integrating this 
in the ongoing research in human biological evolution; and much, much more. Yet 
the humanities are also dedicated, in a tacit fashion, to canon building and asking 
why this is carried out; cultural memory and how it is constructed; prediction and 
projection of cultural evolution and cultural conflict; the development of human 
capacities for the negotiation of new sociocultural situations and new media; the 
investigation of recurrent patterns of thought indigenous to humans, how these are 
different from and similar to other species, and how these are evident in historical 
and contemporary cultural phenomena and might be manifest in the future. 
Cassirer, of course, was more than sceptical about the possibility of predicting the 
future: 
We are incapable of anticipating the future development of civilization. Nor 
can it be completely understood through any amount of empirical knowledge 
of its past and present. Nor can philosophy transcend these limits to our 
empirical knowledge. As critical philosophy, it endeavors to understand the 
universal and basic cultural orientations; it seeks, above all, to penetrate to an 
understanding of the universal principles according to which man ‘gives 
structure’ to his experience. (Cassirer 1961: 36-7) 
Nevertheless, he suggests that attention to ‘Symbolic Forms’ is invaluable as a kind 
of future-orientation of the humanities because it registers the work of culture as 
“precisely that of seeking and creating ever new possibilities” (1961: 37). 
As such, Cassirer is also an important anticipator and in a certain sense an early 
generalizer of the current discussions of Extended Mind - the hypothesis, put 
forward by Andy Clark, that external support structures like writing, language, 
books, diagrams, culture are seminal to the process of cognition and that the 
distinction between inner and outer has less importance to cognitive science than 
often presumed. The Extended Mind thesis, spawning Hoffmeyer’s semiotic 
scaffolding concept, also gives rise to Clark’s famous ‘parity principle’, originally 
articulated, thus, with David Chalmers in 1998:  
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, 
were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part 
of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of 
the cognitive process. Cognitive processes ain’t (all) in the head. (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998, reprinted in Clark 2008, 220-232; later dubbed ‘The Parity 
Principle’ when quoted in Clark 2008, 77) 
Clark and Chalmers address external parts of cognition from the point of view of 
cognition processes:   
... consider the use of pen and paper to perform long multiplication  (...,) the 
use of physical rearrangements of letter tiles to prompt word recall in 
Scrabble (...), the use of instruments such as the nautical slide rule (...), and 
the general paraphernalia of language, books, diagrams, and culture (221).  
The activity of the Extended Mind is summed up in Clark’s Principle of Ecological 
Assembly, emphasizing a mixed-media approach to online reasoning unburdened 
by the internal-external boundary: “... the canny cognizer tends to recruit, on the 
spot, whatever mix of problem-solving resources will yield an acceptable result 
with a minimum of effort” (13). Different such sub-tasks may be served by internal 
or external means of erecting scaffolding, depending upon the purpose and 
affordances offered by the situation. In Hoffmeyer’s semiotic scaffolding, true to 
the tradition of Sebeok, the historical lineage of these means of dealing with sub-
tasks is traced back all the way to the single cell: 
. . . the reason why an interpretant is formed here and now is that the cell 
through its evolutionary ancestry has evolved this particular mechanism for a 
mediation between its sensoric capacity (e.g., the receptors at its surface) and 
its needs (the regularly assured movement towards nutrients). History thus not 
only matters to the cell, but literally operates inside the cell through the 
structural couplings – or semiotic scaffolds – that it has served to build into 
the system (Hoffmeyer 2007: 152). 
For Clark, flexible scaffolding of this kind necessitates Cognitive Eclecticism: 
“computational, representational, information-theoretic, and dynamic approaches ... 
deeply complementary elements in a mature science of the mind” (24). In 
scaffolding terminology it entails that, given a task, a scaffold may be erected using 
whichever means is at hand within the parameters of what Hoffmeyer would call 
the semiotic niche. This liberty in addressing a cognitive problem by different 
means entails an important criticism of supporters of restrictive notions of the 
Embodied Mind hypothesis and aligns Clark more closely with Hoffmeyer’s 
position. Clark critically remarks  
... a tension at the heart of the program that is sometimes so easily (so 
unitarily) glossed as the study of ‘embodied, embedded cognition’. It is the 
tension between seeing body (and world) as expanding the palette of 
opportunities for the realization of cognitive processes and mental states and 
something more fundamentally – but I fear mysteriously – fleshy: the idea 
that embodiment vastly restricts the space of ‘minds like ours’, tying human 
thought and reason inextricably and nontrivially to the details of human 
bodily form (204).  
Like Cassirer, Clark emphasizes the open ability of cognition to develop further 
scaffolding rather than remaining caught forever in a destiny that stems from some 
particular restrictions in human body shape or mind makeup (see Stjernfelt 2004: 
Chapter 7). 
But Cassirer’s Symbolic Forms are not only an important forerunner to Clarkean 
Extended Mind. Rather, they amount to a daring generalization of the scaffolding 
hypothesis. While Clark’s important proposal emerges out of cognitive science and 
thus remains focused upon human online cognition tasks and problem solving, 
Cassirer’s Symbolic Form doctrine extends, as it were, Kant’s related focus upon 
science and cognition to embrace culture and civilization as a whole, beyond the 
cognitive tasks of individuals in the here-and-now.
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 Synthesizing Peirce, Cassirer, 
and Clark, a new vision of the human condition results: one where our dependence 
upon externalized scaffoldings is by no means tragic in the way that, say, Georg 
Simmel took it to be. On the contrary, the fact that those scaffoldings are in need of 
constant reinterpretation, renegotiation, and the fact that they confront problems 
unknown to earlier generations, makes them the most important resource of 
mankind. The mass of established scaffoldings may “weigh heavily on man’s 
shoulders” as Nietzsche might have moaned – but, at the same time, it is precisely 
those scaffoldings which may be changed, reinterpreted, renewed, developed, and, 
as Cassirer surmised, involve the possibility for the further development of human 
semiotic liberty.  
There are a couple of important consequences which we believe arise from the 
foregoing observations on the scaffolding concept and which partly result from the 
way the concept has developed. The first is that the scaffolding idea itself needs to 
be extended in a productive and judicious fashion and that the humanities offers an 
instructive case study to investigate whether scaffolding is an appealing theoretical 
adjunct or a far-reaching corrective to entrenched ways of understanding human 
endeavour. The seeds of Cassirer’s daring generalization of scaffolding are inherent 
in Clark’s and Hoffmeyer’s formulations; however, these seeds require nurture lest 
they fall victim to sterile functionalism. For example, in explicating the scaffolding 
process, Hoffmeyer (2007: 154) writes 
The significance of dynamic scaffolding in the human sphere has been 
pointed out already by the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky, who was 
probably the first to emphasize the importance during child development of 
scaffolding, i.e. experiences with external supporting structures (including 
linguistic ones). At crucial developmental moments, adults help give the child 
the experience of successful actions that child alone would not be able to 
produce (Vygotsky 1986). Some obvious examples include physically 
supporting the first few faltering steps of a near-walker, or supporting a baby 
in water to allow for swimming movements. 
A striking case of a linguistic scaffolding is when a child is ‘talked through’ a 
tricky challenge by a more experienced agent and thereby succeeds in solving 
a problem which was otherwise beyond its abilities (such as learning to tie his 
or her shoelaces). Later, when the adult is absent, the child may often conduct 
a similar dialogue with herself – in which case the speech sounds serve as an 
external memory scaffold to guide the difficult activity and to avoid errors. In 
such cases ‘the role of language is to guide and shape our own behaviour - it 
is a tool for structuring and controlling action, not merely a medium of 
information transfer between agents’ (Clark 1997: 195). 
Both examples here serve exposition and illustrate the beneficial attributes of 
scaffolding which go some way to explaining why its evolution has been so central 
to human cognition. Yet Clark, in a passage quoted by Hoffmeyer, writes 
In general, evolved creatures will neither store nor process information in 
costly ways when they can use the structure of the environment and their 
operations upon it as a convenient stand-in for the information-processing 
operations concerned. That is, know only as much as you need to know to get 
the job done (Clark 1997: 46). 
The image is one of an efficient machine taking the most convenient route round a 
problem and saving labour. This is certainly one central aspect of scaffolding - but 
hardly the only one. Rather, external scaffolding in its broader conception involves 
this issue of of cognitive economy along with a broad series of other affordances, 
stability, intersubjectivity, repeatability, negotiability, storability, reintepretability, 
cross-cultural communicability - and much more. In the face of this, the humanities 
can offer instruction in the development and diversification of the scaffolding 
concept. The very notion of the different use-values connected to these scaffolding 
affordances forms, in itself, an important issue of investigation.  
What can be gleaned from even a rudimentary knowledge of the history of culture 
is that it has been characterized not by linear progress in any way but, instead, by 
cul-de-sacs, blind alleys, clashes, competition, oblivion, resurgencies, discovery of 
the significance of previous developments many years after they have been made, 
and so on. The scaffoldings with which the humanities are concerned are 
sometimes ‘successful’ in local and non-apparent ways, often more serpentine in 
their sometimes eventual fruition in terms of use-value. Frequently, creativity 
seems to be devoid of use-value and the use-value of the humanities is not 
infrequently characterized by opacity and plurality rather than transparency and 
unity. Indeed, this is a point that, sometimes, has been lost in McLuhan’s notion of 
media as ‘extensions’ of psychic or physical features of the human which, along 
with Logan (2013), we find to be congruent with Clark’s (and Hoffmeyer’s) 
scaffolding. As has been found on more than one occasion, McLuhan’s extensions 
are not immune to adoption in functionalist narratives of technological 
development where necessity is self-evidently the mother of invention. Winston, to 
take one example, has been critical of such a functionalist view because it does not 
correspond with what has been observed in history. Technology has not leapt 
forward in a revolution of new utility; instead, it has been characterized by 
faltering, fits and starts, dead ends, suppression of invention, revolt against 
innovation, failure to finance innovation and sometimes sheer luck. He writes 
(1998: 5) 
A German thought of the telegraph in the last years of the eighteenth century, 
three decades before the first working device. A Frenchman hypothesized the 
telephone in 1854, more than 20 years before Bell. The idea of television, 
which depended on the identification of the phenomenon of photoemission 
(i.e. that certain metals produce electrons when stimulated by light) was 
suggested in 1877. Bell Laboratory workers began worrying about the 
transistors in the 1930s when solid state amplifiers had already been 
envisaged for a decade. Some of these thinkers went on to test their ideas ‘in 
the metal’; many did not. But more often than not their work was know to 
those who set about building devices. 
Scaffolding, then, is not something that necessarily announces itself with 
immediate use-value, in a revolutionary solution to old problems. It develops, 
instead, often in a labyrinthine fashion, subject to influences within distinct and 
sometimes clashing social formations, whether those latter are early hominid 
communities or the industrial societies of late capital. 
Before the idea of scaffolding was developed, particularly in relation to its 
operation within the broader remit of the human’s Umwelt, Sebeok had considered 
the conclusions which might be drawn from the lack of use-value that is arguably 
at the root of much aesthetic behaviour. In his 1979 article, ‘Prefigurements of art’, 
written at a time when he was trying to re-introduce the work of Jakob von Uexküll 
to the academy, Sebeok embarked on an extended review of the then extant 
literature regarding animals’ ‘aesthetic behaviour’. Surveying observations of 
gorilla ‘dancing’, chimpanzee’s painting and the satin bowerbird’s nest decoration, 
Sebeok focuses on the artistic activities of some animals and the seeming 
purposelessness of such behaviour in relation to natural selection. Tentatively 
positing the aesthetic impulse in animals as ‘subordinate’ to, in Dawkins’ terms, 
the principal interest of the survival machines that are individual animals, Sebeok 
ultimately reaches a more nuanced conclusion. Aesthetic behaviour, he finds, 
serves no direct survival purpose for the animal; yet it serves an indirect or delayed 
purpose insofar as is varies and extends the animal’s modelling of the world, 
adding that extra insight into the qualities within an Umwelt that ‘art’ has 
commonly – without conclusive proof – been assumed to provide in different 
measure for humans. A similar argument may be made for the existence of play in 
most species of some intelligence. In Sebeok’s formulation, aesthetic behaviour is 
not so much a subsidiary to the ongoing process of survival, but an integral part of 
human modelling that has enabled humans not only to negotiate the complexity of 
their environment more ably, avoiding predation and surviving for longer, but also 
to envisage new (aesthetic) worlds in a manner which is not identical to, but is 
cognate with, attempting to anticipate the future (Cobley, in press). Scaffolding, a 
more specific component of this process, similarly needs to be understood in this 
‘indirect’ way: not just as a utilitarian coupling which enables fine motor activities, 
information processing and externalized linguistic dialogue but, crucially, too, 
‘feelings’ and aesthetic dispositions which may not immediately appear to assist 
the human’s progress in the world. If the scaffolding concept is unable to 
incorporate this insight from the humanities then it risks becoming one more 
machine metaphor for human cognition. 
As well as the future vistas of the humanities, scaffolding needs to be approached 
with reference to the past, the cultural heritage about which the humanities are so 
frequently concerned for different political reasons. Philosophers have dreamt of 
cutting away scaffoldings, conceiving them as burdens of the past. They have 
assumed that a ‘blank slate’ offers new possibilities rather than a regression to the 
unnegotiable conditions of our ancestors. Romantics, vitalists and existentialists 
have all nurtured such dreams of starting again, wiping away traditions and 
dismantling scaffolds in search of a presumably simple human essence (sometimes 
inventing dangerous policies in the process). Naturalist reductionism may commit 
a related error. To be sure, evolutionary epistemology and neuroscience continue to 
make important, even central contributions to understanding the human condition; 
but the idea that the only real understanding of human beings lies in pondering life 
conditions of our ancestors in the East African savannas or lies in charting the 
hardwiring of the human brain is untenable. The way that these perspectives add to 
our understanding of human beings is not by revealing the one and true human 
condition but  precisely because they necessarily track the route upon which 
human beings became able to construct the ongoing scaffoldings of culture. Those 
scaffoldings develop by the day and thus continuously reveal new aspects of the 
human condition which were in no way apparent in our 1.0 version on the savanna. 
Rather, an extended notion of naturalization will necessarily have to include the 
enormous field of human extensions as a very central part of human nature, so that 
there is no way around the detailed study of those extensions in order to 
continually update our understanding of human nature.  
Having noted how linear, merely functionalist framings of the scaffolding process 
are undesirable and how evolutionary accounts of human cultural development are 
incomplete without due regard to scaffolding, a further point should be added in 
respect of the conduct of the humanities. A focus on the scaffolding process as the 
central plank of the humanities does not at all legitimate the idea that all 
scaffolding is to be treated as sacred or unquestionable. The beautiful but naive 
idea that human cultures are distinct, separated and of equal value - the cultural 
relativism thesis (cf. Eriksen and Stjernfelt 2012) – fails to take into account that 
cultural scaffoldings are in constant development, competition, collaboration, and 
hybridization. Scaffoldings could quite feasible be evaluated, in all epochs, in 
terms of their contributions to human experience, action and liberty. The 
possibility that any culture might dream about being alone in the world is long 
gone. There is no one external yardstick allowing a measured comparison of 
cultures - but the mutual involvement of cultures with each other precludes any 
idea that some of them may survive unchanged, in splendid relativist isolation, in 
pristine, original shape, because no such shape ever existed. Rather, there are 
indeed many competing cross-cultural yardsticks which is evident from the 
existing plethora of rankings of countries by GNP, health, Gini coefficient, human 
rights, corruption, crime, democracy , alphabetization, education, universities, 
internet access, etc.. If the humanities’ task is the tracking of culture, then 
scrutinizing the ongoing development of externalized semiotic scaffoldings will 
not only provide the appropriate focus for future vistas, but it will also insulate the 
humanities from the temptations of scientific reductionism on the one hand, as well 
as anthropological relativism on the other. At the same time, humanities taken as 
the study of external scaffolding takes them away from the airy image of loose 
interpretations of fluffy fantasies - it obliges the human sciences to commit to the 
study of a robust field of empirical objects: those very material vestiges, texts, 
books, technologies, artworks, databases, buildings, infrastructures, media, 
institutions, rituals, events which are so many subspecies of external scaffoldings.  
Confronting the challenge of use-values in their scientific and economic guises, a 
focus on scaffolding does not simply reject such challenges as fatuous but, rather, 
re-casts and re-invests them with greater dignity and nuance. 
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1 In an important book, Lassègue (in press) charts how the notion of "symbolic form" in Cassirer 
emerged out of two often-overlooked sources. One is Felix Klein's systematic generalization of 
geometry by means of group theory, after the grand challenge to mathematics posed by the 
appearance of non-Euclidean geometries in mid-19 C. His famous Erlangen program envisaged a 
general system of all possible geometries, defined by the related sets of invariances and 
transformations characterizing each of them - thereby opening also for the further development 
of future geometries for special purposes. Cassirer was deeply impressed by this result and took 
it as a model for Symbolic Forms more generally: the idea that, e.g. artistic expressions or 
languages might also be articulated as an open system where each single language could be 
characterized by its set of invariances and transformations. The second source was Einstein's 
relativity theory  - to which Cassirer dedicated a (1920) book immediately before embarking on 
the grand symbolic forms project, seeing, in effect this project, generalizing Kant,  as an 
equivalence in philosophy to Einstein's generalization of Newton. 
